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coupled with the boy's love for his own father and his father's 
mother-show a case which as a matter of law entitled him 
to have his determined on its merits. It could only 
be determined on its merits by finding whether his interests 
would best be served the appointment of the guardian 
whom he sought. If the in this respect were favor-
able, and his nominee was a fit and proper person (as was 
found), then he was entitled to an order granting his petition. 
The mere conclusional finding because the boy had a 
place in the home of his mother and stepfather it was not 
"necessary or convenient" to appoint a guardian for him) 
upon which the trial court and the majority here dispose of 
this case, begs the real issue. In fact, disposition of this case 
on that ground denies to Richard his day in court on the 
real issue. 
For further and adequate discussion of this case reference 
is made to, and I adopt, the decision prepared for the District 
Court of Appeal by Justice Goodell and concurred in by 
Presiding Justice Nourse, reported at 254 P.2d 960. 
The jndgment should be reversed and the case tried on 
its merits. 
[S. F. No. 18788. In Bank. Nov. 6, 1953.] 
HENRY FORD McCRACKEN, Appellant, v. H. 0. TEETS, 
as Warden, etc., Respondent. 
[1] Criminal Law- Judgment- Execution of Death Sentence-
Sanity Investigation.-Under Pen. Code, § 3701, requiring 
prison warden to call district attorney's attention to fact that 
there is good reason to believe that defendant under sentence 
of death has become insane so that a sanity hearing may be 
initiated, warden's duty depends not on fact of insanity but 
on whether there is good reason to believe that defendant 
has become insane. 
[2] Trial-Findings-Conclusiveness.-Finding of court cannot be 
impugned by antecedent erroneous expression of trial judge. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Criminal 
§ 485. 
§ 501; Am.Jur., Criminal Law, 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Trial, §§ 174, 232; Am.Jur., Trial, §§ 1145, 1147 
et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4] Criminal Law, § 1043; [2] Trial, 
§380; [3] Mandamus, §105; [5, 6] Mandamus, §112(4); [7] 
Appeal and Error,§ 1230; [8] Mandamus,§ 112(5). 
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[Sa, 3b] Mandamus-Findings.-In mandamus proceeding to com-
pel warden of state prison to institute proceedings for inquiry 
into sanity of a prisoner confined under sentence of death, a 
finding that warden, under the circumstances shown and pre-
sumably acting in accord with facts and law, had no reason 
to believe that prisoner was insane is equivalent to or implies 
a finding that there was in fact no good reason to believe that 
petitioner was other than sane. 
[ 4] Criminal Law- Judgment- Execution of Death Sentence--
Sanity Investigation.-In view of Pen. Code, § 3701, it is for 
warden of state prison initially to determine, in exercise of his 
sound discretion, whether there is good reason to believe that 
defendant under death sentence has become insane, and in 
absence of showing to contrary it must be presumed that 
warden regularly performed his duty. (See Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1963, pars. 15, 33.) 
[5] Mandamus-AppeaL-To prevail on appeal from judgment 
denying petition for mandate to compel warden of state prison 
to institute proceedings for inquiry into sanity of a prisoner 
confined under sentence of death, petitioner would have to 
show that there is no substantial evidence to support deter-
mination of question adverse to him, and that evidence im-
pels a finding that there was good reason to believe that he 
was insane. 
[6] Id.-Appeal.-On appeal from judgment denying petition for 
mandate to compel warden of state prison to institute pro-
ceedings for inquiry into sanity of a prisoner confined under 
sentence of death, reviewing court will not consider additional 
evidence relating to petitioner's mental condition since ren-
dition of superior court judgment, where such evidence, if 
formally produced, would be, as was evidence before trial 
court, in conflict. 
[7] Appeal-Taking Additional Evidence.-It was not intended by 
enactment of Code Civ. Proc., § 956a, authorizing the taking 
of additional evidence on appeal, that reviewing courts should 
develop generally into trial courts. 
[8] Mandamus-Appeal.-Where record on appeal from judgment 
denying petition for mandate to compel warden of state prison 
to institute proceedings for inquiry into sanity of a prisoner 
confined under sentence of death indicates an erroneous view 
by trial judge of warden's duty in the premises and does not 
contain a finding expressly resolving controlling issue whether 
there was good reason to believe that petitioner had become 
insane, a motion to dismiss the appeal will be denied, but 
where reviewing court, on consideration of cause on its merits, 
is satisfied that petitioner has not been prejudiced by errors 
noted, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed. 
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Marin 
County. N. Charles Brusatori, Judge pro tern.* Affirmed. 
Motion to dismiss appeal denied. 
Proceeding in mandamus to compel warden of state prison 
to institute proceedings for inquiry into sanity of prisoner 
confined under sentence of death. Judgment denying writ, 
affirmed. 
George H. Chula and James C. Monroe for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Clarence A. Linn, 
Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent. 
SCHAUER, J.-Petitioner is confined under a judgment 
which imposes the death sentence for first degree murder. 
He has appealed from a judgment which denies his petition 
for mandate to compel the warden of San Quentin to institute 
proceedings for an inquiry into his sanity, and the attorney 
general has moved in the alternative to dismiss the appeal 
as frivolous on its face (see People v. Shorts (1948), 32 Cal. 
2d 502, 506, 516, 518 [197 P.2d 330]; Williams v. Duffy 
(1948), 32 Cal.2d 578, 583 [197 P.2d 341]; People v. Adam-
son (1949), 34 Cal.2d 320, 338 [210 P.2d 13]) or, on like 
grounds, to affirm the judgment denying mandate. We have 
determined, under all the circumstances of this case, to deny 
the motion to dismiss the appeal and to consider the cause on 
its merits. Upon such consideration it appears that the judg-
ment must be affirmed. 
After the judgment of conviction was affirmed (People v. 
McCmcken (1952), 39 Cal.2d 336 [246 P.2d 913]) and a date 
for execution of sentence was set, the superior court stayed 
execution to permit a hearing of the petition for mandate. 
Petitioner relied upon the statutory rule which peremptorily 
forbids execution of a person while he is insane (Pen. Code, 
§ 1367) and the implementing rule that "If, after his delivery 
to the warden for execution, there is good reason to believe 
that a defendant, under judgment of death, has become insane, 
the warden must call such fact to the attention of the district 
attorney ... , " and the latter official "must" initiate pro-
ceedings which lead to a jury hearing on the issue of in-
sanity (Pen. Code, § 3701; italics added). 
As is hereinafter explained, the situation is materially 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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similar to that in W'illiams v. Duffy ( 1948), supra, 32 Cal.2d 
578, although the appeal here appears to have been taken 
in the sincere belief by counsel that, because of uncertainty 
as to procedural law, it was necessary to protect petitioner's 
rights, and was not instituted or carried on as part of a mere 
calculated campaign for delay. The evidence before the trial 
court, as petitioner concedes, was in substantial confiict.1 At 
the close of evidence the trial judge (apparently being of the 
mistaken belief that the law placed upon the warden the 
responsibility of determining the fact of sanity), stated, "the 
law throws upon the Warden . . . the decision as to whether 
in his opinion-not yours, not mine, not the other fellow's-
in his opinion whether the man has become insane after he 
has been received at the institution on a judgment of death. 
. . . I believe this Court has to determine now whether or 
not there has been an abuse of discretion by the Warden.'' 
(Italics added.) Thereafter the court found that the warden 
"has no reason to believe that petitioner is other than sane" ; 
that petitioner "knows the crime for the commission of which 
he has been convicted and the punishment which he is about 
to suffer"; and that petitioner is sane. 
[1] As was pointed out in Williams v. Duffy (1948), S1tpra, 
page 579 of 32 Cal.2d, "the warden's duty, as prescribed by 
... section [3701], depends not on the fact of insanity, but 
on the fact as to whether 'there is good reason to believe that 
a defendant ... has become insane.' " (See, also, Phyle v. 
Dnffy (1948), 334 U.S. 431, 443 [68 S.Ct. 1131, 92 L.Ed. 
1494].) It is urged that the above quoted statements of the 
trial judge show that he ''was mistaken as to the extent of 
his review or the issue before him at that mandamus hearing,'' 
and that the findings do not determine the controlling ques-
tion: Was there "good reason to believe" that petitioner, 
after judgment, had become insane~ [2] The findings can-
'Such evidence was as follows: The court observed petitioner, who 
was present at the hearing but either unable or unwilling to answer 
questions, except that he shook his head indicating negative response to 
his counsel's question, "Do you know where you are?" Petitioner's 
counsel and a psychiatrist testified that in their opinions petitioner was 
insane. The warden testified that in his opinion, based on his own 
observation and on information which he had received from prison 
psychiatrists and physicians, petitioner was sane. The chief medical 
officer and the chief psychiatrist of San Quentin testified that in theh 
opinions petitioner was sane. In evidence, without objection of petitioner, 
were rep01'ts of prison psychiatrists and the prison's chief medical officer; 
the reports state the results of examinations of petitioner made from 
time to time after the date of his execution had been fixed and the 
conclusions that petitioner was sane. 
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not be impugned by the antecedent erroneous expression of 
the trial judge. (Strttdthoff v. Yates ( 1946), 28 Cal.2d 602, 
615-616 [170 P.2d 873]; Southern Cal. Jockey Club v. Cali-
fornia etc. Racing Board (1950), 36 Cal.2d 167, 174 [223 
P.2d 1].) It is true that there is not, as there should be, a 
finding expressly determining the controlling issue. [3a] How-
ever, as is hereinafter explained, the finding that the warden 
"has no reason to believe that petitioner is other than sane" 
must, in the light of the other circumstances here shown, be 
held to be the substantial equivalent of a finding that there was 
not in fact ''good reason to believe'' that petitioner had be-
come insane. 
[4] As appears from the statute (Pen. Code, § 3701) and 
the holding of this court in Williams v. D1tjjy ( 1948), supra, 
page 580 of 32 Cal.2d, it is for the warden initially to deter-
mine, in the exercise of his sound discretion, whether there 
is ''good reason to believe'' that a defendant has become 
insane. In the absence of a showing to the contrary we must 
presume that the warden regularly performed his duty. (See 
Code Civ. Pro c., § 1963, pars. 15, 33.) There is no contention 
that the warden absented himself from the prison or refused 
to take cognizance of pertinent evidence available to him, or 
that the finding that the warden "has no reason to believe 
that petitioner is other than sane'' is in any way related to 
an absence from duty or refusal to consider available evi-
dence. [3b] Therefore, such finding (that the warden, pre-
sumably acting in accord with the facts and law, had no reason 
to believe that petitioner was insane) implies a finding that 
there was in fact no good reason to believe otherwise. (See 
Reiniger v. Hassell (1932), 216 Cal. 209, 211 [13 P.2d 737].) 
Here, as in the Williams ease, supra, the evidence which 
relates to the controlli11g question whether there was "good 
reason to believe" that petitioner had become insane, includ-
ing the testimony of experts, is in conflict. [5] In order 
to prevail on appeal from the judgment based on such evi-
dence, and the necessarily implied finding against him on such 
question, petitioner would have to show that there is no 
substantial evidence to support the determination of the ques-
tion adverse to him, and that the evidence impels a finding 
that there was good reason to believe that he was insane 
(p. 581 of 32 Cal.2d.). This petitioner cannot do upon the 
record. 
Although he has not served and filed an application to 
produce additional evidence pursuant to rule 23 (b) of the 
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Rules on Appeal, petitioner asserts (citing Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 956a) that he could produce evidence relating to his men-
tal condition after the rendition of the superior court judg-
ment in this proceeding which would establish good reason to 
believe that he is insane. Affidavits of petitioner's counsel 
and a psychiatrist have been presented by petitioner and 
reports of prison doctors and psychiatrists have been presented 
by the attorney general. [6] Examination of those docu-
ments, which concern petitioner's mental condition and the 
treatment thereof since the rendition of the judgment deny-
ing mandate, shows that the additional evidence, if formally 
produced, would be, as was the evidence before the trial court, 
in conflict. This case is before us on appellate review, not 
as a matter of original jurisdiction. Hence, it would be in-
appropriate for this court to undertake to resolve the con-
flict. [7] It was not intended by enactment of section 
956a ''that the reviewing courts should develop generally into 
trial courts." (Tupman v. Haberkern (1929), 208 Cal. 256, 
269 [280 P. 970].) 
Petitioner asserts that he is denied due process of law if 
he is not accorded judicial review of the question whether 
there is good reason to believe that he has become insane. 
It has been held that federal due process accords him no such 
right. (Solesbee v. Balkcom (1950), 339 U.S. 9, 12 [70 S.Ct. 
457, 94 L.Ed. 604] .) Nevertheless, in this proceeding it has 
been accorded him. 
[8] Inasmuch as the circumstances of this case have 
brought the entire cause before us, and inasmuch as the 
record, as above noted, indicates an erroneous view by the 
trial judge of the duty of the warden in the premises and 
does not contain a finding expressly resolving the controlling 
issue, it appears proper to deny the motion to dismiss the 
appeal. However, after consideration of the entire record, 
we are satisfied that petitioner has not been prejudiced by 
the errors noted. 
For the reasons above stated, the motion to dismiss the 
appeal is denied. Likewise for reasons above stated, the 
judgment appealed from is affirmed. The stay of execution 
heretofore granted is terminated. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J .. Dissenting.-Humanitarian considerations 
have led the Legislature to extend to persons under judgment 
of death the privilege of avoiding punishment while insane. 
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(Pen. Code, § 1367.) The warden of the state prison is 
charged with the responsibility of determining whether there 
is good reason to believe that a person under judgment of 
death has become insane. (Pen. Code, § 3701.) Mandamus 
cannot properly issue to compel the warden to institute pro-
ceedings under section 3701, since the courts are prohibited 
from suspending the execution of a judgment of death (Pen. 
Code, § 3700), and are without power, except as provided 
by statute, to determine the sanity of a person sentenced to 
death and in the custody of the warden. (In re Phyle, 30 
Cal.2d 838, 846 [186 P.2d 134] ; see People v. Sloper, 198 
Cal. 601, 608 [246 P. 802].) A person under judgment of 
death does not have a constitutional right to have execution 
of sentence suspended on the ground that he has become 
insane. (People v. Riley, 37 Cal.2d 510, 514 [235 P.2d 381] ; 
Phyle v. Duffy, 34 Cal.2d 144, 157 [208 P.2d 668], concurring 
opinion.) Procedural due process does not prevent dele-
gation of the duty of determining the sanity of a person under 
judgment of death to au administrative official and does not 
require judicial review of that official's determination. (Soles-
bee v. Balkom, 339 U.S. 9, 12-13 [70 S.Ct. 457, 94 L.Ed. 604] ; 
Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 405-409 [18 S.Ct. 87, 42 L.Ed. 
515] ; In re Phyle, supra, 30 Cal.2d at 847-850; Phyle v. 
Duffy, supra, 34 Cal.2d at 159-161.) 
Since the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the pro-
ceeding, I would reverse the judgment and direct the trial 
court to dismiss the proceeding. (In re McGee, 36 Cal.2d 
592, 599 [226 P.2d 1] .) 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
Since I am :firmly of the opnuon that mandamus is not 
available to determine the sanity of a person under sentence 
of death and that habeas corpus is the only remedy available 
to such a person, I would reverse the judgment with directions 
to the trial court to dismiss the proceeding. As a basis for this 
conclusion I adopt the reasoning and the views expressed by 
Mr. Justice Schauer in his concurring and dissenting opinion 
in Phyle v. Duffy, 34 Cal.2d 144, page 163 et seq. [208 
P.2d 668], in which I concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
3, 1953. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
